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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 39 1994 NUMBER 5
PROBABILITY EVIDENCE IN MAIL FRAUD CASES
PHILLIP M. KANNAN*
I. INTRODUCrION
0 NE of the elements in the federal crime of mail fraud' is the
use of the United States mail in the furtherance of a fraudu-
lent scheme. Often there is no direct proof that the defendant sent
or received material in the mail. In many cases, the only evidence is
a document submitted by the defendant in an insurance company's
files or a cashed insurance check that was payable to the defendant.
Without direct evidence of use of the mail, prosecutors, in at-
tempting to satisfy their burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt for this element of the crime,2 have relied on circumstantial
evidence. As the court observed in United States v. Hannigan,3 all
circuits with criminal jurisdiction have held that such evidence can
* B.S. 1961, University of North Carolina; MA. 1963, University of North Car-
olina; J.D. 1974, University of Tennessee. Member of the Tennessee Bar and cor-
porate counsel. The views expressed are solely those of the author.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1984 & Supp. V 1995). Section 1341 provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudu-
lent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan,
exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for
unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or
other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to
be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or
authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be
sent or delivered by the Postal Service ... or takes or receives therefrom,
any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or
such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it
is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any
such matter or thing, shall be fined under this tide or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both. If the violation affects a financial institu-
tion, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned
not more than 30 years, or both.
Id.
2. Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1251 (1994) (holding that government
must prove every element of crime charged beyond reasonable doubt).
3. United States v. Hannigan, 27 F.3d 890 (3d Cir. 1994).
(1191)
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satisfy that exacting standard.4 In two cases before the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the prosecutors at-
tempted to go one step further and rely on probability evidence to
prove that the mail was used by the defendant. 5 In both cases, the
government's efforts were unsuccessful. These failures were not
caused by a lack of clarity in legal rules or standards, nor were they
the result of inadequate probability theory. Rather, it was the erro-
neous or incomplete application of probability theory that led to
the failures. This Article explains probability theory and shows how
it can be applied validly.6 It then discusses whether probability the-
ory should be applied.7
There are two separate mathematical analyses that must be
done to test the validity of probability evidence. First, both the data
on which estimates of probabilities are based and the estimating
techniques must be valid.8 Second, the theory that is used to calcu-
4. Id. at 892-93 n.2. The court listed the following cases as examples: United
States v. Kelley, 929 F.2d 582 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 926 (1991); United
States v. Metallo, 908 F.2d 795 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1483 (1992);
United States v. Doherty, 867 F.2d 47 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Salerno v.
United States, 492 U.S. 918 (1989); United States v. Sumnicht, 823 F.2d 13 (2d Cir.
1987); United States v. Bowman, 783 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Scott, 730 F.2d 143 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Wilson v. United States, 469 U.S.
1075 (1984); United States v. Scott, 668 F.2d 384 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Shavin, 287 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1961). See United States v. Davidson, 760 F.2d 97, 99
(6th Cir. 1985) (finding that "reasonable anticipation that mails will be used satis-
fies the mailing element under section 1341"); United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d
988, 999 & n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that use of mail must only be reasonably
foreseeable and sufficiently related to scheme to fall within § 1341), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 982 (1980); United States v. Stull, 521 F.2d 687, 689 (6th Cir. 1975) (find-
ing sufficient evidence that defendant used mail), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1059
(1976); United States v. Dondich, 506 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding that pros-
ecution could use circumstantial evidence to prove mail fraud, but prosecution
failed to provide such evidence in this case).
5. Hannigan, 27 F.3d at 890; United States v. Burks, 867 F.2d 795 (3d Cir.
1989).
6. For a discussion of probability theory and its application, see infra notes 8-
66 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of whether probability theory should be applied, see infra
notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
8. In People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968), perhaps the best known case
in which probability theory was used, both of these requirements were violated at
the trial level. In Collins, the defendant was prosecuted for the robbery of an eld-
erly woman in an alley. Id. at 36. The victim could not identify her assailant, but
she did testify that the assailant was a young woman with blond hair. Id. at 34. A
second person (Bass) who did not see the crime, but who was at the end of the
alley near the scene at the time of the robbery, testified that he heard crying and
screaming and saw a Caucasian woman with dark blond hair in a ponytail run out
of the alley and get in a yellow automobile. Id. He said that it was driven by a
black male with a beard and mustache. Bass testified that the woman had a dark
blond ponytail and was wearing dark clothing. Id. Four days after the robbery the
police arrested a couple consisting of a Caucasian woman with a blond ponytail
1192 [Vol. 39: p. 1191
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late the probability that this defendant in particular, as opposed to
a population in general, used the mail must be valid. Assuming
that the court finds both of these mathematical tests have been
passed, there remains the ultimate question of whether the result-
ing probability is legally adequate to support a finding that, beyond
a reasonable doubt, the defendant used the mail.
To accomplish the two mathematical prerequisites, an expert
witness will be required. Moreover, the final probability ordinarily
will not be a single number, but a range. Some of the probabilities
in that range may be adequate, in the judge's opinion, to satisfy the
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, but some may not. For ex-
ample, would an expert's opinion that the probability could be as
high as 99% or as low as 94% satisfy the standard? That is ulti-
mately a legal judgment that no amount of mathematical theory or
expert opinion should take away from the judge or jury.
II. PRoBABILiTY BAsIcs
Probability theory is a systematic approach to quantifying un-
certainty.9 It is a set of rules by which the truth of statements is
and the defendant, a black male with no beard, who drove a yellow Lincoln with an
off-white top. Id. at 35.
At trial, the prosecutor called a college mathematics instructor to explain cer-
tain rules from probability theory and apply them to a hypothetical question con-
taining the prosecutor's version of the facts of this case. The professor testified
that, if events are mutually independent, the probability of their joint occurrence
is the product of their individual probabilities. Id. at 36. This is called the product
rule. Id. He was then asked, assuming that the following events (characteristics)
were mutually independent and had the individual probabilities given in the fol-
lowing list, to compute the probability that a couple selected at random had all six
of them:
Characteristic Individual Probability
A. Partly yellow automobile 1/10
B. Man with mustache 1/4
C. Girl with ponytail 1/10
D. Girl with blond hair 1/3
E. Negro man with beard 1/10
F. Interracial couple in car 1/1000
Id. at 36-37 n.10.
Applying the product rule to these assumed individual probabilities resulted
in a probability of one in 12 million that a couple selected at random would have
all six characteristics. Id. at 37. The prosecutor then transferred this probability
from the random event and assigned it to the probability that this particular
couple was guilty of the crime. Id. As the California Supreme Court pointed out
in reversing the conviction, these data were invalid, and the transfer of the
probability of a random event to this particular couple was also incorrect. Id. at 38.
Even assuming the data were correct and the six characteristics were mutually in-
dependent, the court showed that the probability that this particular couple could
be "duplicated" was over 40%. Id. at 40.
9. See JOHN G. KEMENY ET AL., FINITE MATHEMATICAL STRUCTURES 112 (1958)
1994] 1193
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associated with a number between zero and one.10 There are sev-
eral interpretations of probability." This Article will use two of
them, namely, probability as relative frequency12 and probability as
a degree of belief, sometimes called subjective probability.' 3
A. Probability as Relative Frequency
The relative frequency interpretation of probability depends
on an experiment or event being repeated a number of times
under essentially constant conditions. If an event is repeated a
number of times, how often will a particular outcome be observed?
For example, assume a box contains green balls and red balls. If a
ball is drawn at random from the box, its color recorded, and the
ball returned, and this is repeated 100 times, the probability of
drawing a red ball on any turn would be interpreted to be the per-
centage of red balls drawn in the 100 repetitions.' 4
If n is a positive integer and one did n sets of these 100
repetitions the percentages pi, P2, .... ,n could be averaged:
n  The average will be a more reliable estimate
of the probability of a red ball than any of the individual percent-
ages. 16 From the average, one could compute the variance or sam-
ple variance, s', which indicates how the individual percentages are
clustered about the mean. The formula is:
s2= (p-mY+(p2 --m)+. . .+(P-mY .17 The square root of the
n-i
variance, denoted by s, is called the standard error or standard
deviation.' 8
Applying theorems from probability theory, the following state-
ments are valid:
("The theory of probability provides a mathematical framework for [expressing a
degree of confidence in a prediction.]").
10. Id. at 112-14; seeViCTOR E. McGEE, PRINCIPLES OF STATISTICS: TRADITIONAL
AND BAYESIAN 305 (1971).
11. See generally Ernest Nagel, The Meaning of Probability, in 2 THE WORLD OF
MATHEMATICS 1398 (James R. Newman ed., 1956) (discussing various interpreta-
tions of probability).
12. MEYER DwASS, PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 4-5 (1970); FREDERICK MOsrEL-
LER ET AL., PROBABILITY WITH STATISTICAL APPLICATIONS 2-3 (1961).
13. MOSTELLER ET AL., supra note 12, at 310-12.
14. DwAss, supra note 12, at 4-5.
15. PAUL G. HOEL, ELEMENTARY STATISTICS 19-20 (2d ed. 1966).
16. See id. at 123-29.
17. Id. at 25-32; DAVID S. MOORE, STATISTICS CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSIES
169 (1979).
18. HOEL, supra note 15, at 27; MooRE, supra note 17, at 168.
[Vol. 39: p. 11911194
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1. The probability is approximately .68 that the percentage of red
balls is between m-s and m+s;
2. The probability is approximately .95 that the percentage of red
balls is between m-2s and m+2s;
3. The probability is approximately .997 that the percentage of
red balls is between m-3s and m+3s. 19
The interval from m-s to m+s is called the "68% confidence
interval"; from m-2s to m+2s, the "95% confidence interval"; from
m-3s to m+3s, the "99.7% confidence interval."20
These are the elementary, basic principles that are needed to
apply the relative frequency interpretation of probability theory to
mail fraud cases.2 1
B. Probability as a Degree of Belief
The interpretation of probability as a degree of belief can be
developed by considering the concept of a fair bet.22 Based on the
concept of expected value, 23 the degree of belief of a statement will
be defined as p for a given person, if and only if that person consid-
19. HOEL, supra note 15, at 97-98, 139-41; MooRE, supra note 17, at 270-74.
20. HOEL, supra note 15, at 140-41; MOORE, supra note 17, at 274.
21. In addition to their use in data analysis, statistical means and variances
can provide models for conceptualizing abstract ideas, even in law. See, e.g., KEN-
NETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATVE LAW TEXT § 29.02 (3d ed. 1972). Professor Da-
vis states:
If we could measure intensity of review of evidence and express the result
numerically (as, of course, we cannot), we might find that the clearly-
erroneous test calls for intensity which is, say, 27 per cent [sic] of substitu-
tion of judgment, that the substantial-evidence rule calls for 17 per cent
[sic], that actual review under both tests ranges from zero to 100, with the
bulk of cases under both tests between 5 and 50, with only a slight bunch-
ing under the clearly-erroneous test from 20 to 30, and with only a slight
bunching under the substantial-evidence rule from 15 to 25.
Id.
22. MCGEE, supra note 10, at 306.
23. The expected value of an event with outcomes 01 and 02 where P1 and P2
denote the respective probabilities is defined as E=P0 1+P20 2. MOSTELIER ET AL.,
supra note 12, at 169. For example, a mortality table gives .992 as the probability
that a 25-year-old man will survive one year. If a $1000 insurance policy has a $10
premium per year, the expected value to the insurer is (.992) (10) +
(.008) (-990)=$2. See id. at 170-71. Expected value is a concept that has found
application in tort as a means of determining the level of care to be imposed on
society. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947) (Hand, J.) ("[T]ihe owner's duty... to provide against resulting injuries is a
function of three variables: (1) the probability [P] that [the ship] will break away;
(2) the gravity [L] of the resulting injury . . . (3) the burden [B] of adequate
precautions.... [LIiability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
P."); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 648 (4th ed. 1971) ("The question be-
comes the familiar one of balancing the probability and gravity of the harm against
the value of the product and the inconvenience of precautions.").
5
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ers the bet in which he receives $a if s is true and pays $ [.--p] a ifs is
false to be fair and any other arrangement unfair. This is because
his expected value for winning is pa and for losing it is also pa
because [a] (1-p) =pa.
Another model for the interpretation of probability as a degree
of belief is as follows. Consider a sequence of boxes labeled B0, BI,
.... B100 each containing a well-shuffled deck of 100 cards. In box
Bk there are k cards marked "true" and 100-k marked "false." Then
to say that for a given person a statement s has subjective probability
.8 is defined to mean that the person would be as willing to bet
$100 that s is true as he would be to bet $100 that a card drawn
from B80 is marked "true."
24
Subjective probabilities can serve a useful purpose in cases in
which there is evidence of generality and it is desired to transform it
into evidence about a particular person. For example, in a case in
which plaintiff was hit by a blue bus, the generality that 4 of the blue
buses in the neighborhood belong to defendant can te useful in
proving that one of defendant's blue buses hit this plaintiff.2
5
III. ATrEMPTS TO USE PROBABILITY THEORY IN MAIL FRAUD CASES
In United States v. Burks,26 a physician was prosecuted under 18
U.S.C. § 1341 for willfully participating in a scheme to defraud in-
surance companies.2 7 The government attempted to prove that
Burks submitted fraudulent medical bills to an attorney with the
knowledge and intent that they be transmitted by mail to an insur-
ance company.28 The testimony on the use of the mail was from
two witnesses, one who said that most of the time the mail was used,
and one who said that 99% of the time the mail was used. 29 The
court recognized that circumstantial evidence can be used to prove
the mail was used.30 However, to do so required (1) evidence that
24. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1329, 1347 (1971) (summarizing L. SAVAGE, FOUNDATIONS
OF STATISTICS (1950)).
25. Id. at 1346. ("That datum [four-fifths of blue buses are operated by the
defendant] can obviously point to a correct conclusion in the particular case, for it
suggests that, in the absence of other information, in some sense there is a 'four-
fifths certainty' that defendant's bus hit this plaintiff.").
26. 867 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1989).
27. Id. at 795.
28. Id. at 796.
29. Id. at 797.
30. Id. (noting that "circumstantial evidence may be used to prove the ele-
ment of mailing").
[Vol. 39: p. 11911196
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made specific reference to the mailing in question3 l and (2) that
the evidence "exclude all reasonable doubt to the extent of over-
coming the presumption of innocence."32 The court characterized
"most of the time" and "99% of the time" testimony as "nothing
more than a probability that the mails had been used.133 The court
concluded that probability was not enough and reversed the
conviction. 34
The probability evidence in Burks was invalid for several rea-
sons. From a purely legal point of view, there was no foundation
for the 99% evidence. 35 The witness should have laid a foundation
for and given the basis of that number. For example, the witness
should have disclosed whether he had counted the entire popula-
tion or had used a sampling procedure.
The evidence was also inadequate for probability reasons. The
mere statement of the frequency as one number without giving a
confidence level and a confidence interval does not aid the
factfinder. In fact, it has the possibility of misleading the factfinder
by creating an impression of exactness. The testimony should have
described the sampling procedure used, the sample size and the
number of samples taken. There should have been an explanation
of the statistical mean and of its use for estimation in probability
theory, the standard error and its use in estimation in probability,
and an explanation of confidence intervals. This testimony would
have required an expert witness. 36 If the evidence had been prop-
erly presented, the factfinder would have been able to make ajudg-
31. Id. (stating that inference of standard business practice is insufficient
without specific reference to mailing in question).
32. Id. (quoting United States v. Brooks, 748 F.2d 1199, 1203 (7th Cir. 1984)).
33. Id.
34. Id. (" '[P]robability is not enough to convict a party of mail fraud.'"
(quoting United States v. Scott, 730 F.2d 143, 147 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Wilson v. United States, 469 U.S. 1075 (1984))).
35. See EDWARD W. CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 21, 109 (2d ed.
1972) (explaining that "party should 'lay the foundation' for [the] introduction
[of evidence]"); see also People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 39 (Cal. 1968) ("A founda-
tion for the admissibility of the witness' testimony [the table of characteristics and
probabilities in supra note 8] was never even attempted to be laid, let alone estab-
lished."); State v. Sneed, 414 P.2d 858, 862 (N.M. 1966) ("We hold that mathemati-
cal odds are not admissible as evidence . . .so long as the odds are based on
estimates, the validity of which have [sic] not been demonstrated.").
36. This is the standard set by Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
FED. R. EVID. 702. This standard applies to federal cases. Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2790 (1993).
1994] 1197
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ment as to whether the procedure used to calculate the 99% was
adequate and whether the entire range of probabilities in the confi-
dence interval satisfied the standard of proof of beyond a reason-
able doubt.
A second mathematical fallacy in the government's attempt to
rely on probability theory was far more subtle than the first one.
Whereas the more obvious one was not mentioned by the court, it
did detect this more subtle one and based its decision against the
government on it. The court was willing to accept the flawed testi-
mony that 99% of the time the mails were used. However, it cor-
rectly refused to transfer that probability from the population as a
whole to the one document that had been submitted by the defend-
ant.3 7 The court stated that "reliance upon inferences drawn from
evidence of standard business practice without specific reference to
the mailing in question is insufficient."3 8 In probability terms, us-
ing the relative frequency interpretation of probability, the effect of
the court's ruling was to differentiate between, on the one hand,
the event of selecting a document at random from the insurance
company's claims files, which would have a 99% probability of re-
sulting in one sent by mail and, on the other hand, locating a spe-
cific predetermined document and determining the probability
that it had been sent by mail. When the prosecutor focused on a
particular document rather than selecting one at random, the 99%
probability that it had been mailed was no longer applicable. Thus,
although the 99% evidence should have been excluded on mathe-
matical grounds, the court's failure to do so did not change the
outcome because it detected the error of transferring 99%
probability from a random event to a non-random one.
Although the refusal to transfer the 99% probability and the
result in Burks are valid, the court opened the door to misunder-
standing, debate and misapplication of its decision when it stated
that " [p] robability is not enough to convict a party of mail fraud."3 9
37. Transferring probability from one event to a different event was one of
the errors the California Supreme Court detected in the trial court's verdict in
Collins. The prosecutor had incorrectly treated the probability of one in
12,000,000 that a couple selected at random would have all six characteristics as
equivalent to a probability of 11,999,999/12,000,000 that the particular couple was
guilty. CLEARY ET AL., supra note 35, § 204 (pointing out that error and observing
that, even assuming arguendo that data relied on by prosecutor were correct,
probability of guilt of particular defendant would be approximately 41%, which
agrees with California Supreme Court's calculation).
38. United States v. Burks, 867 F.2d 795, 797 (3d Cir. 1989).
39. Id. (quoting United States v. Scott, 730 F.2d 143, 147 (4th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Wilson v. United States, 469 U.S. 1075 (1984)).
1198 [Vol. 39: p. 1191
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Taken out of context, this statement appears to be a wholesale re-
jection of probability evidence. This statement, however, cannot be
stripped of the two conditions the court itself imposed on it; namely
that (1) circumstantial evidence can suffice if it makes specific ref-
erence to the mailing in question 40 and (2) circumstantial evidence
can suffice if it "directly support[s] the inference and exclude[s] all
reasonable doubt to the extent of overcoming the presumption of
innocence." 41 The court in Burks only rejected an invalid applica-
tion of probability theory; it did not foreclose the correct use of
probability evidence. Unfortunately, this distinction has not been
observed as courts have sought to apply Burks.
Because, out of context, the statement that probability is not
enough to convict can be interpreted as a rejection of probability
evidence, a later panel in the same circuit criticized and questioned
Burks. In United States v. Hannigan,42 the defendant was indicted on
two counts of mail fraud in connection with filing automobile insur-
ance claims. On appeal, the court only addressed the issue of
whether the evidence was adequate to support a finding that the
defendant had knowingly caused a check for $4001.13 to be deliv-
ered by the United States Postal Service.43 The only proof on that
issue came through one witness, Skowronski, a claims supervisor for
Travelers, the insurance company. She described the procedure
for paying claims like the one submitted by Hannigan. Following
creation of a file and receipt of an appraiser's estimate, Travelers
would issue a check to pay the claim. The department in which
Skowronski worked, located on the fifth floor, issued the check. If
the check was to be picked up at Travelers' office, the processing
form contained a '" in the block entitled "attachment." If the en-
try was "N" the check was to be mailed. 44 The form for defendant's
claim was marked "N", which Skowronski testified as meaning that
the check was to be mailed. She testified that such checks would be
put in envelopes and sent to Travelers' mail department on the sev-
enth floor. She did not work there nor did she testify as to the
business practices in that department. There was no testimony that
the mail department sent the envelopes containing such checks via
40. Id.
41. Id. (quoting United States v. Brooks, 748 F.2d 1199, 1203 (7th Cir. 1984)
(emphasis supplied by the court)).
42. United States v. Hannigan, 27 F.3d 890 (3d Cir. 1994).
43. Id. at 891 (indicating that defendant raised numerous points on appeal,
but court would address only one issue).
44. Id. at 892.
19941 MAIL FRAUD 1199
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United States mail.4 5
The court recognized Burks as binding precedent 46 but distin-
guished this case from Burks. The court interpreted Burks to mean
that proving the use of mail by circumstantial evidence requires
both evidence regarding the standard business practice and evi-
dence that makes specific reference to the mailing in question.
Whereas the prosecutor in Burks had presented sufficient evidence
on the standard business practice but failed on the specific refer-
ence requirement, in the present case there was a complete rever-
sal. Here the prosecutor had met the specific reference
requirement, but failed on the standard office practice of the mail
department. Thus, the court was able to follow the legal rule estab-
lished by Burks and reverse the conviction.4 7
While acknowledging that it was bound by Burks, the court
questioned its validity. This occurs in an extensive note.48 The
analysis by the court in this note reads Burks too narrowly and ap-
pears to ignore the distinction between a random selection from a
set and the selection of a predetermined element of the set. That
is, this court fell into the trap, which the Burks court had avoided, of
improperly transferring the probability from one event to another.
This confusion can be seen from the following quotation:
In Burks, we found that there was insufficient evidence to
support the mailing element of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. We so
held even though a witness testified at trial that the busi-
ness entity in question used the United States mails "99
percent" of the time. Despite the testimony of a 99%
probability that the correspondence had been mailed, we held
45. Id. at 895 (noting that "the government presented no evidence concern-
ing the custom and practice of Travelers in the use of the United States mails").
46. The general rule that a later panel is bound by the precedent of an earlier
anel in the same circuit applies to the Third Circuit. Siegel v. Alpha Wire Corp.,
94 F.2d 50, 53 n.2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990). However, this rule is
riddled with exceptions. See Phillip M. Kannan, The Precedential Force of Panel Law,
76 MARQ. L. REV. 755, 766 (1992-93) (concluding that courts have eliminated in-
terpanel rule by creating "a spiraling array of exceptions"). If the Hannigan court
believed that Burks was inconsistent with Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398
(1970), which was decided before Burks, or if it concluded that the law had been
changed by the later Supreme Court decision in Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239
(1994), it was not bound by Burks.
47. Hannigan, 27 F.3d at 893-94 ("In this case, ironically, the government met
the specific reference requirement of Burks .... Had the government presented
competent evidence that as a routine practice the mail room sent claims checks
through the United States mail, the verdict would be sustained.").
48. Id. at 893 n.3 (distinguishing this case from Burks and questioning contin-
ued viability of analysis in Burks).
1200 [Vol. 39: p. 1191
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that without a "specific reference to the mailing in ques-
tion," such testimony "establishes nothing more than a
probability that the mails had been used," and we reversed
the conviction.49
The court transformed the 99% probability that the business
used the mail into a 99% probability that the defendant had mailed
his report that was found in the business' files. The record in this
case reveals nothing about the probability that the defendant used
the mail to submit this particular report.
The Hannigan court also expressed doubt 50 as to whether Burks
is consistent with two decisions of the Supreme Court, Turner v.
United States51 and Victor v. Nebraska.52 It should be noted that to
create even the possibility that Burks is inconsistent with Turner or
Victor, Burks must be interpreted as a rejection of probability evi-
dence. As pointed out above, that is an invalid interpretation of
Burks. Nevertheless, even assuming arguendo that such an interpre-
tation was valid, a careful comparison of Burks to these decisions
shows that it is compatible with both.
Turner involved a statute that permitted the jury to "infer that
heroin possessed in this country is a smuggled drug."53 As the con-
curring opinion in Hannigan points out, Turner involved a statute
that placed on the defendant the burden of coming forward with
evidence to rebut the "smuggled" presumption allowed by the stat-
ute.54 It did not hold that probability evidence alone may satisfy the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard. That issue was not before the
Court in Turner, and Turner created no precedent on that point.
The basic distinction between Burks and Victorwas pointed out
by the concurring opinion in Hannigan.55 As that opinion ob-
served: "Victor dealt with uncertainties based on inferences and
conflicting testimony, not with uncertainty stemming from 'naked
statistical evidence.' "56
After discussing these two Supreme Court cases and decisions
from other circuits, all of which acknowledge that circumstantial
49. Id. (citations omitted) (first emphasis added) (second emphasis supplied
by the court).
50. Id.
51. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 415-18 (1970).
52. Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1247 (1994).
53. Turner, 396 U.S. at 416.
54. Hannigan, 27 F.3d at 896 (Becker, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 896-97 (finding Victor not unavoidably inconsistent with Burks).
56. Id. at 897.
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evidence need not implicate guilt with 100% probability, the Hanni-
gan court stated:
In light of the above-cited authority of the Supreme Court
and our sister courts of appeals, we believe it was incorrect
for us in Burks to suggest that the government must prove
that a business used the United States mails 100% of the
time (or greater than 99% of the time) in order to estab-
lish the mailing element of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. 57
This characterization of Burks is incorrect. Burks did not re-
quire 100% or 99% probability. The Burks court held that
probability evidence alone would suffice "so long as the circum-
stances proven directly support the inference and exclude all reason-
able doubt to the extent of overcoming the presumption of
innocence."58 By this language, the Burks court acknowledged a
concept that a California court described as the balance courts
must strike between the power of "[m]athematics, a veritable sor-
cerer in our computerized society ... [to] assist[ ] the trier of fact
in the search for truth"59 and the risk that mathematics will "cast a
spell over him."60 The Hannigan court was less successful in re-
sisting the spell. The existing principles in Burks, taken as a whole
rather than placing undue emphasis on one sentence taken out of
context, represent a proper balance between probability evidence
and the constitutional standards of criminal law.
The principle formulated in Burks for the use of probability
evidence to prove mailing, namely evidence of standard practice
followed by specific reference, can be fit into the degree of belief
interpretation of probability. That interpretation combined with a
result from probability theory called Bayes' Theorem, would be a
more promising approach for using probability theory to prove that
the mail was used. Bayes' Theorem enables one to refine a priori
estimates of probabilities into a posteriori probabilities by consider-
ing additional data.61 While a priori estimates may be based on rela-
tive frequency evidence or represent a subjective interpretation of
57. Id. at 893-94 n.3.
58. United States v. Burks, 867 F.2d 795, 797 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting United
States ,. Brooks, 748 F.2d 1199, 1203 (7th Cir. 1984) (emphasis supplied by the
court)).
59. People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 33 (Cal. 1968).
60. Id. (holding that testimony regarding mathematical probability infected
case with fatal error and distorted jury's traditional role of determining guilt or
innocence according to long-settled rules).
61. See, e.g., MOSTELLER ET AL., supra note 12, at 143-50 (explaining and prov-
ing Bayes' Theorem).
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probability, in most cases the estimates will be subjective. The addi-
tional data used to refine a priori probability may be statistical data
and represent either the relative frequency or the subjective inter-
pretation of probability.
IV. COMBINING A PRIOR1 PROBABILITY AND EVIDENCE-
BAYES' THEOREM
Basic definitions and notation are necessary to develop and ap-
ply Bayes' Theorem. Letters of the alphabet will be used to denote
statements; for example, g could denote the statement that the de-
fendant is guilty of a crime; E, the statement that the defendant fled
the scene of the crime; c, the statement that the plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent. If s is a statement, its negation is denoted by
-s. If p is a statement, "p and q" denotes the statement p and q.
For any statement x, Pr[x] is the probability that x is true; or briefly,
the probability of x.
In the following discussion it may be helpful to think of c as a
legal statement such as "defendant was negligent" or "defendant is
guilty," and E as an evidentiary statement such as "defendant was
wearing a red plaid shirt." The conditional probability that a con-
clusion c is true, given that E is true, is denoted Pr[cJE] and defined
as r,.ll =Prlc andl 62
as •,PE.
The definition of conditional probability is intuitively reason-
able. If E is given to be true, then the only way c can be true is for c
and E to be true. Thus, the ratio Pr[c and El is the relative fre-
quency of the truth of c given 
E.
The application of conditional probability theory to law will
often involve statements linking guilt or liability with evidence; for
example, Pr[defendant is guilty I defendant fled the scene]. At times it is
convenient to rearrange the conditional probability definition into
Pr[c and El = Pr[ clE]Pr[E].
One other result from probability theory is needed to develop
Bayes' Theorem. Because s can be true in two mutually exclusive
ways, namely when s and g are true or when s and -g are true, it
follows that Pr[c] =Pr[ c and E] + Pr[ c and -E].
The a posteriori probability of conclusion c given evidence E can
be found by manipulating the formulas above as follows:
62. Id. at 85-91, 133-37.
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=Pr[c and E] Pr[E and c]
Pr[E] Pr[E]
Pr[El c] Pr[ c]




= Pr[Elc]Pr [c] + Pr[El'-c]Pr[ -c] I
This shows that the a posteriori probability, Pr[clE], is the a priori
probability, Pr[c], multiplied by the factor in the brackets.
An example, taken from Laurence Tribe,64 will illustrate the
usefulness of this result. Defendant is on trial for murder. Let g
denote the statement that he is guilty and let E denote the fact that
he left town on the first available plane after the murder was com-
mitted. A juror has a degree of belief of 2 that defendant is guilty
before hearing of his flight; i.e. Pr g] =r This juror's subjective1 3.probabilities are that the probability of such a flight if the defend-




Bayes' Theorem with these data is
Pr[g E] = [I) (2) (I) () ="
The evidence that defendant took the first available flight increased
2 4this juror's degree of belief of defendant's guilt from g to 4.
A second example will illustrate how lawyers can use Bayes'
Theorem in developing trial strategy. The defendant is being pros-
ecuted for child abuse. The victim has a broken ulna in his left
arm. The state has presented a strong case, which defendant's at-
torney estimates as having a 95% probability of establishing the
63. Id. at 146; see also Tribe, supra note 24, at 1352 (presenting formula in
given form).
64. Tribe, supra note 24, at 1353-54.
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guilt of the defendant. The defendant's expert could testify that
the fracture resulted from a torsion force; that this type of fracture
is observed in 70% of child abuse cases involving the child's arm
and in 20% of cases in which children have broken this bone in an
accident. Applying Bayes' Theorem:
Pr[ Guiltl Torsion Break] =
Pr[ Guilt] Pr[ Torsion BreakI Guilt]
Pr[ Guilt] Pr[ Torsion Breakl Guilt] + Pr[Not Guilt] Pr Torsion BreakiNot Guilt]
(.95) (.7) .665 .665
= -= -
.985
(.95) (.7) + (.05)(.2) .665+.01 .675
Thus, the added testimony would increase the probability of
conviction to 98.5%. This fact should be considered by
defendant's counsel in deciding whether to put the expert on as a
witness. Had the facts been that the victim did not have a torsion
break, the 95% probability of conviction would be. reduced to
(.95) (.3) .88, which may not be "beyond a reasonable(.95 .3) + (.05) (8) -"
t and which would be an important datum for defense coun-
sel to consider in deciding whether to use this expert.
V. INTERPRETING BuRs UNDER BAYES' THEOREM
The court in Burks did not reject probability theory as a means
of proving that defendant used the mail; it required evidence that
made specific reference to the mailing in question. 65 That is pre-
cisely the data needed to calculate the factor in Bayes' Theorem,
namely Pr[E I c
namely + Pr[EJ-c]Pr[~c]; that converts an a priori
probability into an a posteriori probability.
Under this approach, the court would accept the 99% figure as
the a priori probability that the defendant used the mail. 66 The gov-
ernment, however, would have to introduce data for calculating the
above factor and the a posteriori probability that the defendant had
used the mail. An example of such data is illustrated in Hannigan.
The government could have developed evidence and testimony re-
garding the entry of "Y" and "N" on the processing forms. Under
65. United States v. Burks, 867 F.2d 795, 797 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting that gov-
ernment presented no evidence regarding correspondence specifically and thus
failed to meet burden under § 1341).
66. Tribe, supra note 24, at 1346-47 (justifying judicial use of evidence of gen-
erality in particular case).
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the relative frequency interpretation of probability, the government
would have an expert study the actual processing of claims and de-
termine the two relevant error rates, that is, how often forms con-
taining ' " were mailed and how often forms containing "N" were
picked up at the Travelers' office. This data collection would have
yielded statistical means, standard errors and confidence intervals,
not single, precise probabilities. Bayes' Theorem could then be ap-
plied with these data and the 99% a priori estimate to yield the a
posteriori probability range that the mail was used. In this process,
the prosecutor may face a dilemma regarding data. If she insists on
99.7% levels of confidence, the corresponding confidence intervals
will be longer and this in turn may reduce the a posteriori probability
below the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. On the other
hand, accepting 95% confidence levels for the data is subject to the
criticism that this same or greater uncertainty contaminates the a
posteriori probability, implying that the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard will not be met.
VI. THE IMPRACTICABILITY OF PROBABILITY EVIDENCE
Burks and Hannigan are not in conflict on the question of
whether probability theory can be used to prove mailing. The disa-
greement is over how to use it. As discussed, the criticisms the Han-
nigan court raised concerning the legal rules in the Burks decision
are themselves flawed.67 While both decisions have shortcomings,
Burks is clearly closer to the mark. Its requirement that the
probability evidence make specific reference to the mailing in ques-
tion is sound law. It assures that the evidence will be relevant and
mathematically sound because it eliminates the error of transfer-
ring the probability of a random event to a non-random one.
It is clear that probability evidence theoretically can be used in
mail fraud cases. However, it is very doubtful from a practical point
of view that it should be used. The practical problems are that per-
centages are usually either only an opinion based on no data analy-
sis or improperly stated as single numbers rather than confidence
intervals. When confidence intervals are used, in order to assure
the high levels of probability demanded in criminal trials, the confi-
dence intervals may contain numbers that do not satisfy the beyond
a reasonable doubt standard. Perhaps there are exceptions, but
from the prosecutor's point of view, the presumption in deciding
67. For a discussion of the Hannigan court's criticisms of the legal rules in
Burks, see supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
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how to prosecute a mail fraud case should be against the use of
probability evidence.
Generally, defense counsel should welcome any attempt by the
government to use such evidence, because it will be fertile ground
for error. From the point of view of the defense, the best combina-
tion would be a case that relied on probability evidence introduced
by a witness who was not qualified as an expert in the field. On the
slippery slope created by cross examination a statement by a super-
visor in the mail room that 99% of the time the mail was used could
easily slide to 98%, 97%, 96%, 95%, 941/2%, 94%,.939/4%, 931/2%,
931/4%, 93%, right on down the scale until it clearly would not be
beyorid a reasonable doubt.
There are criminal cases that have benefitted from probability
theory. Prominent among these are cases in which physical evi-
dence such as fingerprints68 and DNA samples69 are matched with
samples taken from the defendant, as well as cases in which frag-
ments at the scene of the crime are matched with possessions of the
defendant.70 In these examples, admission of the probability evi-
dence requires the testimony of a subject matter expert. Such testi-
mony would lay a proper foundation for the data to be used,
explain the theory used and the analysis performed, and then give
an opinion. Contrast this procedure to the probable testimony in a
mail fraud case on the issue of the use of the United States mail.
Although an expert would be needed, he or she would be an expert
in probability theory, not a subject matter expert. There is simply
no subject, except probability, that is relevant to the issue of mail
use. An expert's testimony in a mail fraud case would resemble that
given in civil cases such as discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.71 Such testimony can be based on data
analysis and not require a subject matter expert in employment to
give an opinion. 72 Nevertheless, as the concurring opinion in Han-
68. See, e.g., United States v. Pisano, 193 F.2d 355, 359 (7th Cir. 1951) (con-
cluding that trial court properly submitted fingerprint evidence to jury).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 568 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating
DNA evidence and statistical probabilities are scientifically valid and admissible
under Rule 702 of Federal Rules of Evidence); I.W. Evett, DNA Statistics: Putting the
Problems Into Perspective, 33JuRmTRICSJ. 139, 139-45 (1992) (addressing concerns
regarding statistics of DNA profiling).
70. See, e.g., CL.AY ET AL., supra note 35, §§ 202-06 (describing legal doctrines
relating to experimental and scientific evidence).
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
72. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08
(1977) (holding that where gross statistical disparity is shown, that alone may, in
proper case, constitute prima facie case of pattern or practice of discrimination);
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (ap-
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nigan observed, "the use of statistical evidence in cases under Title
VII... is a matter of statutory interpretation rather than a general
evidentiary rule permitting reliance solely upon statistical evi-
dence."73 Admission of statistical evidence in a civil case to estab-
lish a prima facie showing of disparate impact under a statute that
has been interpreted to make such impact illegal74 is hardly persua-
sive precedent for finding that such evidence meets the beyond a
reasonable doubt test in a criminal case based on a criminal statute
with no room for an impact analysis.
proving use of statistical analyses to establish racial and employment
discrimination).
73. United States v. Hannigan, 27 F.3d 890, 897 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994) (Becker, J.,
concurring).
74. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-33 (1971).
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